Introduction

Japan accomplished a great economic feat after World War II and is currently the third-largest national economy in the world, succeeded only by the United States and China. Despite their tremendous growth, Japan acquired 2011 a debt to GDP (gross domestic product) of two hundred per cent of their national annual income (Singh, BBC News 2013). In order to circumvent this enormous debt, earlier this year, Japan imposed an increase in sales tax (Reynolds & Mogi, 2013). With rising pressure reaching an almost irreversible situation, Japan’s ageing population continues to grow, putting pressure on young people to support pensioners—Japan is known to have the largest ageing population in the world (International Longevity Center Japan, 2013). To further compound Japan’s economic and social system, Japan is known for having the lowest birth rates in the world, with a population of 126 million, which has been reduced gradually every year and is expected to disintegrate by one-third in 2060. There have been a number of theoretical analyses concerning the downward spiral descent of Japan’s fertility rate, including: “celibacy syndrome”, costs of living and education, the reduced usefulness of having children, the rise of opportunity cost in bearing children, and reduced income levels (Leibenstein, 1957; Becker 1960). Japan’s current decline is symptomatic of an economic culture imposing stark and ravenous conflict with traditional gender roles. In an interview with the BBC, Nobuko Ito, a typical case of a modern Japanese woman, stated that “if you want to keep working, you have to forget about your children, you have to just devote yourself to the company” (Wingfield-Hays, BBC UK 2013). Matsui et al. (2010) proposed a revolutionary concept that should become the primary focus of Japan’s Womenomics policy. Matsui et al. (2010) argue that the state of Japanese inequality has reached an unprecedented level, that 70% of women, once they’ve had a child, are forced to leave the workforce with little chance of returning (p. 3).

Heavily industrialized societies like Japan are experiencing equal, if not greater, shifts in demographic composition and relative decline in population. With an increasingly volatile scenario, the opportunity cost of marriage for women within a rigid and inflexible employment system is too great for women who want a chance to return to the same occupation they held prior to childbearing. Consequently, raising children will impose an unnecessary burden on career-oriented women unwilling to sacrifice several years of education. Public parks and green spaces, as well as local parks for children, are not plentiful or accessible; in addition, raising children in small living spaces and in crowded apartments has become commonplace (Higuchi et al., 1991). Women who attempt to work outside their family life face tremendous stress raising their children single-handedly. The increasing demand for fathers to remain at work has caused a major setback in fertility because men are not engaged enough to provide help to mothers; naturally, women tend to remain as housewives with little opportunity to return back to work after their child is born. Raising children in a highly competitive environment that encourages limited entrance to top universities and institutions, as well as the increasing pressure to exceed on their respective entrance exams, puts insurmountable pressure, psychologically and financially, on families, forcing women to remain at home to raise their children to meet these expectations (Retherford et al., 1996; Higuchi et al., 1991).

The number of Japanese children born in 2023 sank to an all-time low of 727,277, while the total fertility rate shrank to its smallest level on record, health ministry data showed on June 5. It was the eighth consecutive year for both figures to decline. (Japan sees record low births, fertility rate in 2023)

source: Japan readies ‘last hope’ measures to stop falling births – Nikkei Asia

This essay argues that the primary cause of this decline is social inequalities, and Pierre Bourdieu’s contributions will become the theoretical framework for interpreting the stereotypical and traditional gender roles imposed by men and women. I argue that the habitus tremendously influences the current decline in Japan’s birth rate. To begin, this essay will first provide a literature review and an overview of the theoretical framework of the habitus, followed by an inspection of the current scenario in Japan. Moving forward, this essay will describe the government’s short-sightedness, followed by a historical and traditional overview of the deeply constructed habitus and then explore the workplace settings.

Theoretical Framework

In creating habitus, Bourdieu sought to answer some basic, fundamental questions, such as: How is human action managed or controlled? More specifically, Bourdieu wanted to contextualize the regularity of human action without turning into the product of determinism and the influences of the more comprehensive, external world—Bourdieu wanted to create a theory of action.

Habitus is a concept that remains quite distant from traditional behaviourist theories, rational choice, and conformity. Behaviourists, like Skinner, argue that stimulus-response patterns result from operating conditioning (Skinner, 1953). On the contrary, according to Bourdieu, Bourdieu argued that behaviour is cultural and motivated by the interplay of past experiences constitutive and adaptive to external reality or structures. Rationalists argue that rationality is the source and test of knowledge and that reality is intrinsically logical (Coleman, 1990). For Bourdieu, humans carry out their actions practically, informally and spontaneously and may or may not necessarily be strictly rationally driven. The habitus does not adhere to the assumptions of conformity, a mixture of roles, norms and cultural rules (Parsons, 1951); instead, according to Bourdieu, humans are adaptive, strategic and constitutive of their culture—they can also adapt to changes and may not necessarily be governed by norms, rules, and roles.

The habitus embodies a series of profoundly internalized dispositions, blueprints of conduct, knowledge, and skills that incorporate both mental and physical aspects acquired initially through individual early childhood socialization. Bourdieu (1990) defined habi-tus as a:

System of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them (p. 53).

While this definition is needlessly complex, I will provide that children raised in a family of writers are likelier to develop a keenness for literature, poetry, and writing. They will acquire their abilities from societal dispositions and the knowledge needed to appreciate literature and the writing process and become writers themselves. Children begin internalising these dispositions through early socialization, creating a habitus of “structured structures.” Early childhood socialization formulates these internalized dispositions that constitute the structured structures of daily living, i.e. the internalized dispositions become structured in a world of various structures.

Dispositions are formed through social interactions, imitation, role-play, integration, and participation. These internalized dispositions are not fixed or deterministic. Instead, they cultivate the production and reproduction of different or new actions that coincide with their previous, original dispositions. The habitus facilitates expectations, practises, and perceptions that coincide with structuring characteristics of previously socialized behaviours. In this way, people have their habitus, an amalgamation of residual history that operates in the present to constitute an individual’s perceptions and thoughts.

Bourdieu theorized that the habitus is an integral aspect of society that constructs individuals through socialization; however, society depends on the continuity of individual social interaction. Bourdieu’s definition awkwardly separated two distinct characteristics of the habitus: “structured structures” enacted upon “structuring structures.” What Bourdieu is trying to say is confounded in linguistic riddles; however, he maintains that dispositions constitute the basic building blocks that provide unlimited and creative ways of structuring them. Bourdieu used game analogies to explain “structured structures.” In a sports game, players are bound by the rules of play (structured); however, they can adapt and creatively implement strategies to win (structures).

Habitus, or “habit” in mainstream psychology and sociological inquiries, is not a concept tied to repetition and routine but is connected with Bourdieu’s mid-term “dispositions.” While a habit is static, general and uncompromising, leaving little to no flexibility for spontaneous behaviour and individual decisions, a disposition is merely an expression of the possibility of acting, not a guarantee. Due to this misunderstanding, many have accused Bourdieu of being deterministic.

The habitus describes human interaction’s informal and practical nature and subsequent actions. Naturally, not every action that people perform is consciously motivated—in this way, the habitus provides space for dispositions to manifest and actualize (Bourdieu, 1984). The habitus forms “generative schemes” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 94) across a person’s entire lifespan; they are intensely structured patterns of behaviour transferred across many domains in life. While each person has a different habitus, there are no two identical individuals because their biographical details are unique; however, individuals also need to exist collectively; this way, the habitus is collective-oriented. To a large degree, the habitus exhibits group-specific characteristics, and according to Bourdieu, individual conduct is “never more than a deviation” from these collectively developed schemas (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 60). Habitus creates a social order that provides individuals with an understanding of fundamental interactions that people perform in various social hierarchies, whereby the principles of inclusion and exclusion are enacted.

Based on these generative schemes, individuals of a specific social caste internalize their position and social milieus and understand what they can do, what they cannot, and what is possible for people of their caste. As such, individuals formulate their consciousness and understanding of what expectations they can look forward to based on their habitus—in essence, they adopt an understanding of their “sense of one’s place” (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 471). In describing an individual’s sense of place, Bourdieu conceived of the habitus consisting primarily of unconscious internalizations (formed in early childhood socialization). With these internalizations already in place, an individual’s habitus conducts and provides the realm of existence, the pace at which they can affect as determined by a person’s status, social class, and demographic (gender, race, ethnicity). Consequently, the dispositions of habitus cultivate individuals to react in particular ways and conduct their social lives based on their resources and experience.

In Bourdieu’s seminal piece Distinction (1984), the habitus described the overall dispositions of social action and interaction, but it was not the only factor that contributed to or constrained the likelihood that dispositions individuals would manifest. In Distinction (1984), Bourdieu added two concepts to draw a holistic picture of human practises: field and capital. Although this essay intends not to delve deeper into field and capital, it will be necessary to conceive of a general concept of both terms to situate the habitus in a more tangible form.

The disposition of habitus is influenced heavily by capital, that is, the number of available resources and the motivations individuals have to acquire these resources. Capital manifests in three ways, according to Bourdieu: economic, cultural, social, and symbolic, which are unevenly distributed between individuals and social classes. For example, a child raised in a family with significant capital will have more excellent dispositions towards the capital, and their expectations will also match according to these standards. People can have dispositions that are great in cultural capital but not economic capital and vice-versa—investing in one will mean relinquishing and balancing the capital of another (i.e. using economic capital to invest and acquire more cultural capital).

An essential aspect of the definition of habitus concerns “structured structures,” or, as Bourdieu considers, field. Social interaction does not occur in a vacuum; instead, it occurs under structured contexts. The field is where dispositions struggle over valuable resources (capital). There are many fields like the legal field, political, artistic, and economic and members of these social milieus struggle for the resources they can acquire from these fields. These fields are structured because individuals must perform their actions in a manner that is suitable and acceptable to their field. Fields moderate the habitus—opportunities and chances individuals acquire are moderated through their habitus dispositions.

As depicted in this illustration I created, Bourdieu’s concepts must be considered an inseparable triad. The interplay between these three variables provides room for change and uncertainty. Consequently, there is no “fixed” pattern because individuals have a unique mix of these three dispositions; no viable “template” can ever be surmised. Within the uncertainty lies the potential for unpredictable outcomes, characteristic of human nature—change is possible, and adapting to new fields is always a progressive endeavour.

Change is possible, according to Bourdieu, but it is also tricky to entirely change deep-seated early childhood socialization–internalized dispositions are enduring. Throughout life, individuals encounter challenging situations whereby their habitus must be altered slightly or majorly to adjust to their newly discovered structure (field). This process is time-consuming and very slow, leading towards newly developed unconscious internalized dispositions that add onto primary dispositions, not fundamentally alter them.

In any given scenario, if past experiences and the current situation are identical, the individual will rely on past experiences to conduct the behaviour for the moment; if these scenarios do not challenge dispositions, it will be improbable for individuals to change their long-held internalized dispositions.

The habitus can conserve society. Habit-formed actions are reproduced to sustain the social order because habitus-based actions depend on previous experience. Rather than react differently, individuals generate responses consistent with what they have learned, reproducing their internalized dispositions and, ultimately, the social order.

Brief Historical Overview of Fertility Decline

Japan became attentive to the decline in 1990 when fertility reached 1.57 per household, now commonly known as the “1.57 shock” (Atoh, 2002). Japan’s Ministry of Health and Welfare 1994 introduced the Angel Plan, a five-year program that would catalyse fertility to typical averages to combat declining fertility. The Angel Plan sought to amend childcare policies, enhance work and childrearing compatibilities, and bridge major issues concerning parental leave from work. A positive consequence of the Angel Plan has been the reinforcement and amendment of the Childcare Leave Laws designed to support income and exempt social security premiums. Before the Angel Plan had been developed, Japan made slow progress in response to the continuous fertility decline—the Angel Plan, so to speak, was the “nail in the coffin.” The Japanese government assembled the Angel Plan in relative haste. With marginal success, the Angel Plan (AP) called for an increase in the capacity of the public nursery schools, the overall expansion of the services offered by nursery schools, such as infant care, lengthier availabilities for childcare, support for temporary or part-time childcare as well as community childcare support. AP would make childcare its primary motive to alleviate the family burden by introducing after-school care services for elementary school children and making it possible for family support centres to be prominently available (MHW, 1998). The Angel Plan was renewed for another five years, spanning 1999-2004, in a coordinated effort to provide financial incentives to families. The New Angel Plan (NAP) would introduce parental leave benefits increase of up to 40 per cent of the wages of those who would take their leave as well as extend parental leave up to three years for government employees; in addition, child allowance would be available for children up to six years old versus three years in the previous policy (MHLW, 2002).

In summary, the New Angel Plan would:

1. boost child-rearing services;
2. improve employment settings to encourage and facilitate women’s participation in the 
workforce;
3. revise the strict binary divisions between gender roles and workplace culture;
4. health system revisions for women and children;
5. revise educational settings specific to children;
6. stress-free educational environment for children;
7. reducing financial burden for parents seeking to educate their children;
8. housing reform and town planning measures to support child-rearing.

The Measures to Cope with a Fewer Number of Children Plus One, initiated in 2002, was another policy designed to boost fertility. The Plus One initiative supported child-raising, workplace life, and community-based child care. The Plus One initiative called for revising corporate policies and the working styles of men and women to bridge the gender gap. In an attempt to mimic other First World nations, Japan sought to reshape its social system to make life suitable for individual lifestyles, promoting individuality and security with the belief that it would increase fertility. Japan was beginning to socialize child-raising, developing an infrastructure of social welfare policies that would generate positive results in fertility. Shortly after The Plus One policy, in 2003, two more laws were implemented: the Law for Basic Measures to Cope with Declining Fertility Society and the Law for Measures to Support the Development of the Next Generation. Previous policies were interested in increasing the number of births, a quantitatively driven policy.

‍
In contrast, the Next Generation policies were concerned with quality rather than quantity, specific conditions in the economy and society causing detrimental consequences to fertility, and adopting initiatives to support the next generation. Furthermore, the Next Generation policy forced companies with more than 301 employees to submit plans and detailed numerical information about how they plan to stop fertility decline. These two policies would reinforce the position held by the Japanese government to address this issue as a social problem using welfare policies to alleviate the fertility decline. Following these policy developments, the New-New Angel Plan was enacted between 2005-2009 to promote independence and individuality and assist in child-raising. Additional measures included countermanding and bridging the dichotomies of work and family life. This new plan would revise family life, promote family cohesion, and emphasize the significance and importance of the family’s role in society. To usher even greater significance, government spending is expected to increase from 13.7 per cent in 2000 to 16.7 per cent by 2050 (Bräuninger, Gräf, Gruber, Neuhaus & Schneider, 2002).

‍
The Gold Plan, a social welfare system for the elderly, acquired the bulk of attention long before the decline in fertility and the late 1980s. Japan set forth policies enforcing companies and institutions, specifically municipalities, to curb the ageing population. In addition, this would put pressure on the healthcare system, employees and individuals. Federal and local governments collected taxes as early as 1963 to support this initiative. The Gold Plan would operate almost simultaneously with the Angel Plan, which had taken fruition long before the official recognition of fertility decline.

‍

Government Shortsightedness

The Angel Plan was far too big of an endeavour for Japan; they could not oversee its development and had little power to reinforce their objectives at the local level. The Ministry of Finance in 1990 reported a reduction in income tax due to demographic shifts, reducing the budget of all the initiatives they had set in place from 1990, encompassing the original Angel Plan until its most recent, the New-New Angel Plan. According to Tsunoda and Glosserman (2009), “Public pension spending in Japan is predicted to grow from 8.7 percent of GDP in 2005 to 14.3 percent in 2030, and it will reach 20.2 percent in 2050. Furthermore, this occurs while a shrinking younger generation has to support a growing elderly population” (p. 27). In addition, old-age benefits are putting immense pressure on healthcare and pensions, which have acquired fruition and prominence as early as the 1960s (Boling, 1998). Operating parallel to the Angel Plan, The Gold Plan absorbed tremendous resources from municipal, local, and national governments, including employers and health insurance issuers.

The Gold and Angel Plans, including subsequent laws enacted to reinforce the individual, lacked financial support since issuers, employers, and national and local governments were already experiencing less than pleasing results and were under tremendous pressure suddenly from their respective leadership. While the Gold Plan had a long time to develop, there was a period of a slow accumulation resulting in extensive financial coverage for the elderly; however, when the situation was compounded, a dilemma arose: how much could they allot to both plans? Shortly after the Angel Plan was released, in October 1996, the Ministry of Health and Welfare announced its plans for reducing the proposed expansion of the Angel Plan; consequently, MHW would be responsible for encouraging organizations and other private, market-oriented approaches rather than developing relations with local governments to facilitate daycare services (Nikkei, 29. Oct. 1996, p. 1). The two child-care leave laws enforced in 1992 allowed parents to take a two-year leave of absence following the birth of their child, as well as 25 per cent of their salary under the employment insurance system (Prime Minister’s Office 1995, p. 25), were endorsed and recommended to private enterprises through government subsidies, the decision to grant employment insurance would become voluntary and without any legal consequences (Ministry of Labour, December 1996).

One of the policy-affecting entities deployed in first-world nations is interest groups, which have the power to effect and alter developing policies. In Japan, the primary source of policy change and innovation lies within the bureaucracy in the hands of professional actors who work in relative isolation. Hrebenar, Nakamura and Nakamura (1998) reported that “Japan is not an interest group society” and that “its citizens largely watch the political game being played by the ‘professional actors, politicians and media representatives'” (p. 551). Bureaucrats rely on various technocratic methods and opinion surveys to gather information about demographic concerns and channel their influence and policies across the legislature and the Diet.

Traditional habitus – Confucianism & the Shōgun

Having provided a brief overview of the current governmental influence on this issue, I turn to historical and traditional developments that hinder any progressive political strategies. The reason for the failure of both Angel Plans and the continued lack of success by government institutions and regulatory bodies is quite apparent—they are producing and actively reproducing habitus. Although this endeavour to explain historical and traditional habitus is not meant to be a definitive exercise, it should be understood from the given analysis: the decline in Japan’s fertility rate. To begin, a brief overview of Confucianism as a habitus-structuring phenomenon will be provided, followed by the ancient practises of the Shogun as ordering principles for men.

Confucianism is one of China’s three-pillar spiritual faiths, followed by Taoism and Buddhism. While Taoism and Buddhism influence in Japan, it is not as pronounced as Confucianism and, based on this understanding, this analysis unfolds with an overview of Confucianism (“Conf.”). Conf. made its way from Korea to Japan around the mid-sixth century (Tucker, 2013) and has remained an influential factor in societal customs, behavioural expectations, and preferences in Japanese society. While some contend that the influence of Conf. is declining, no other means can perfectly explain the structured structures that Bourdieu emphasized in Habitus.

Confucianism is a philosophy that provides the foundations of proper behaviour and human relationships. In order to acquire spiritual sensibilities and moral ascension, individuals must enact the virtues and principles of Confucianism (i.e. literal activities and meditation, proper conduct and behaviour with oneself and others). Essentially, the goal of Confucianism was “to establish [a] stable, reciprocal, ethical, but fundamentally non-egalitarian social relationships based on gender, age, and position in society” (Chinn, 2002, p. 304). Confucianism categorized and, through differentiation, alienated aspects of conduct expected by husbands and wives, father and son, employer and employee, etc. These practises result in common moralistic tendencies manifesting as internalized dispositions leading to producing and reproducing desirable, expected behaviour.

Confucianism ethics held that loyalty and trustworthiness were critically relevant to the success of relations. In addition, justice as a moral concept plays an essential role in judgement and balance.

This justice can manifest in responsibilities, obligations, and duties characteristic of an individual at the moment, and a denial of this moral essentialism will mean internal condemnation or a state of moral imbalance. Confucianism was a philosophy that delineated the ideal human governance system.

For filial piety, Confucianism attempted to amplify the difference between men and women, husband and wife, parents and children, and wife and parents-in-law. Central to its teachings, five cardinal virtues lay at the heart of interpersonal relationships: fidelity, wisdom, politeness, justice, and benevolence (Sugano, 2005). In the Onna Daigaku (“Greater Learning for Women”), a teaching manual for women’s conduct, Confucian family morality dictated that a man may divorce his wife for any of the following reasons: does not submit to his father and mother if she is promiscuous, steals becomes jealous or catches a horrible disease. In addition, a woman must obey three people: her father, husband, and children (Sugano, 2005). Classic Confucianism persisted until 1868 after several thousands of years of deeply internalized dispositions becoming the dominant and salient aspect of Japanese society.

One of the most famous symbols in Chinese philosophy is the Ying-Yang theory. According to Confucianism, Yang symbolizes light, religious and positive aspects of existence (men), and Yin symbolizes the negative, dark and unknown (women). Based on the Yin-Yang theory, documents like the Onna Daigaku were drafted to force women to submit and comply (i.e. to control Yang). Nevertheless, Conf. philosophy came under great scrutiny after World War II, and such documents as Fukuzawa’sFukuzawa’s New Onna Daigaku attempted to revolutionize the way Conf. isolated philosophy women by undermining its basic, tenants as mentioned above (Sugano, 2005). The goal was to situate Japan’s society with European and American customs for independence and freedom; however, such reverence for North American and European society was not well-received (WWII, Japan supported Hitler, Hiroshima and Nagasaki’sNagasaki’s decimation) because Japan had a deep-rooted anti-American and anti-European sentiment. Fukuzawa’s hope for an equal society encountered tremendous backlash, primarily from Hirahara’s critique (Sugano, 2005). During revolutionary times, Hirahara sought to reinstate classic Confucianism with alterations to suit the time. Hariharan brought the focus to men in the Otoko Daigaku Wado Kun (“Lessons in Harmony for Men’s Learning), indicating that men need to be compassionate and chaste, achieve a harmonious balance between work and the home, show respect to women and avoid secrecy, exercise openness with spouses (Sugano, 2005). In effect, the new Daigaku from Hirahara would put women as the central focus, but more positively. Despite revisions and the changes sought by philosophers, the original Onna Daigaku was used as a supplemental instructional guide for women in schools and remained a mainstream resource even after the end of World War II (Sugano, 2005).

Despite revisions to the Constitution, the Onna Daigaku remained a prevalent and consistent influence on behavioural expectations for women even after the new Constitution was established (Sugano, 2005). Sugano (2005) stated that “under the surface, a sentiment which could not fully reject the old “Onna Daigaku”-based Confucian ethics continued to smoulder” (p. 252). In retrospect, Sugano (2005) added that:

This lingering attachment alone may perhaps be regarded as proof that a way of thinking that could not reject the mode of male-female relations based on “Onna Daigaku” and its brand of Confucian ethics had penetrated so widely and deeply into the consciousness of people before the war (p. 252).

Confucianism, both classical and neo-Confucianist philosophies, functions as a powerful structuring element in Japan. Habitus-defined social engagements effectively limit and pressure women to submit to patriarchal and domestic expectations. Hirahara’s revision insisted that money should be entrusted to wives, and today, that is the case. While men spend 130% of their week working, women are expected to care for both finances and ensure their children are well looked after.

‍

The Shōgun

The Shōgun (1192-1868) (military commander) was Japan’s feudal military governance and rule system. It coincided with Confucianism and was often the philosophical tool used by the shogunates to naturalize their power and consolidate their influence. The shōgun established Bushido, a warrior’swarrior’s code of conduct and the Hagakure to descriptively detail any man’s behavioural and moral expectations, including a soldier. A samurai’s behaviour was equivalent to what a man would be required to behave. To fully understand these structured structures that Bourdieu discussed, it will be necessary to discuss one of the most well-known and highly respected tales in Japanese society today—the defining character expected of men, both behaviourally and morally. It is this story that epitomizes the structured habitus for men.

The Shōgun requested Lord Asano and other nobles to adjourn before a representative. The designated official, Lord Kira, taught Asano proper behavioural conduct. When Kira requested a large sum of payment for his teaching, and Asano refused, Kira ridiculed and offended Asano in front of his noble peers. In retaliation, Asano drew his sword and slashed Kira’s arm—a gravely forbidden act to draw your sword in the shōgun castle. The shõgun ordered Asano to take his life to commit seppuku (when a samurai’s honour was relinquished, to reclaim it, the samurai commits suicide to restore his honour). Upon Lord Asano’s death, his 47 samurai warriors, now without their master (ronin) and their honour and position in society, sought to regain their honour and valour by avenging their master’s master’s death. The 47 ronin killed Lord Kira and his followers, and once their master was engaged successfully, their duties were fulfilled, and in the name of their master, they all committed seppuku. Today, they are remembered as champions of justice, heroism, valour, honour, and courage to go against the shōgun in the name of their master.

The male habitus was beginning to take shape in the form of the moral teachings of samurai warriors. To be a samurai was one of the greatest honours of the day, akin to being employed in a company. The samurai held the ideal virtues of honour, self-discipline, unquestioning loyalty, bravery, and self-denial and became the ideals of moral conduct for men since shogunates manifested in 1192. During this time, women were not even provided legal existence, were unable to own property, and were considered lower to men. Women were responsible for ensuring the proper upbringing of those born of the samurai class—this subjugation was made possible by Confucianism.

Masculine Habitus

Understanding the roots of the male habitus, i.e. shōgun teachings, the current state of reproduction and production of these Confucius and samurai teachings manifest in the workplace. Both formal and informal expectations very strictly hold Japanese workplace culture together. While workers find it inconsequential to adhere to formal routines, informal expectations place greater emphasis on individual behaviour and attitudes, often resulting in workplace bullying and subtle abuse—bureaucrats have expressly stated that such workplace attitudes are beyond the scope of policy implementation (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 21 Nov. 1996). This workplace habitus has long since been naturalized, and even government agencies recognize the difficulty of detaching these often automatic processes.

Japanese society and culture, especially the workplace, is heavily marked by a psychologically ordained behaviour called saving face. Workers seek to reduce situations that hinder their social position or reputation in the workplace. This way, they adopt a “face” willing to cooperate and perform beyond the company’s needs. In its reproduction, this is akin to samurais practising their self-denial during the shogun era, that is, their ability to relinquish their internal dispositions for honour, duty and responsibility. Consequently, people reduce embarrassing situations that would negatively impact their public image and prevent others from believing they are ineffective in social situations (Brown, 1970; Miller, 1987; Schlenker & Leary, 1982). Saving face is a critical phenomenon in Japanese workplace culture because an individual’s performance is tied directly to their work ethic, effort, and dedication to the company. With strict expectations and the threat of being replaced, the only way an individual can prove their worth is to reproduce desirable qualities and traits from their master (i.e. their employer).

Japanese culture rewards individual behaviour through their dedication towards their collective orientation, and performance is critical when judging individual effort. Kasai (2009) reported that “effort (doryoku) and persistence (gamba) have been rated as the first and second most frequently used words in Japanese, respectively” (p. 166). The extent of this moralization manifests heavily in workplace environments; there is a high rate of voluntary overtime (Kumazawa, 1996), including a tendency to refuse to take paid holidays, causing overwork and instances of death (karōshi) (Nishiyama & Johnson, 1997). Compared with traditional shōgun teachings, internalized dispositions of the employee’s habitus are reproduced proportionally to the employer’s needs. Samurais were known for their extreme behaviour, unending persistence, devotion to their master, and reverence for the needs of their master. Although circumstances and the overall environment have changed, the typical Japanese worker needs to embody the samurai’s moral dedication—the effectiveness of the production and reproduction of these internalized dispositions can be the deciding factor of the employee’s success in the company.

These pressures cause paranoia because finding sustainable positions in companies is challenging due to employment scarcity; workers are willing to do whatever it takes to save face and ensure lifetime employment. The consequence is evident: fathers are not at home enough to help their wives with housework and assist in the child’s overall care.

Discussion

Bourdieu’s habitus lends a resourceful insight into explaining the deep-rooted internalized dispositions permeating socio-political milieus. Bourdieu’s extensively defined theory of social inequality can be transposed to the Japanese case, primarily because the problematic habitus brought on by history and subsequently normalized have caused an almost irreversible problem for the Japanese government. The Japanese government is subject to the habitus that has formed their government, social class and order.

Without an adequate resolution, the consequences will be enormous if Japan does not actively engage in gender equality. With growing disparity and more significant division of labour, women are seen as convenient instruments to be used in times of economic stress. Instead, women must be genuinely integrated into corporate affairs, governmental policies, and cultural milieu. Current political and corporate conditions force women to decide between a fulfilling career and a life without the possibility of career advancement. In order to advance a more gender-equal society, Japan needs to move towards an integrative, semi-tradition-free environment that encourages female participation in the workforce, reduces the intensive amount of effort-based sacrifice for companies, and allows more time for men and women to have children.

Despite the problematic scenario, the situation is somewhat unresolvable; small steps are needed to alleviate growing gender disparities and find a standard balance. For starters, no traces of the original Onna Daigaku (“Greater Learning for Women”) must be found inside public schools—while it is educational for women to know of its existence, it should not be the guiding principles of female conduct and expectations, this would merely impede any progressive habitus structures. Women should also be rewarded for their individuality and not for the preservation of the family unit; they should be positively encouraged to climb the corporate ladder and be given involvement in political and domestic affairs.

For men, their habitus is equally challenging to overcome. With the influence of Confucianism, the lingering moral stories and the history of the Shōgun, men have already predetermined structures that have long been internalized and that their likelihood performance and responsibilities are a mandate for their success at home and work. Unwritten rules and expectations dominate the workplace, where the fight for capital in an increasingly scarce field means that men are willing to put their lives on the line. Known as Karōshi (or death from overwork), Japanese men put tremendous stress on themselves and work overtime to become true breadwinners and to show their employers how seriously they take their position and employment. Employers often know little about their employees’ health and assume they are involved completely and voluntarily. Karōshi is the result of a significant heart attack and stroke brought upon by stress, stress that had been voluntary. This is indicative of seppuku (ritual suicide), and in the end, the employee’s death can be seen as honourable and sacrificing for the employer’s overall benefit—in some ways, they would treat Karōshi positively. It should be recommended that men be forced to take their leave of absence, give no priority to those who work near death, and enforce corporate leisure activities to reduce stress.

Having identified the structured structures of internalized dispositions through the historical and present-day confirmation of habitus naturalization, I contend that habitual practice of both men and women as a result of their habitus can be one way to explain the decline in fertility rate. To avert this decline, both men and women should be relieved of some of the duties and obligations, responsibilities that would impede and otherwise complicate child-rearing.

‍

Bibliography

Atoh, M. (2002). Family policies in Japan. Population Association of Japan, 924-928.

Becker, G. (1960). An Economic Analysis of Fertility. In U. N. Bureau, Demographic and

Economic Change in Developed Countries (pp. 209-240). Columbia: Columbia University Press.

Bloomberg:
Tsunoda, T., & Glosserman, B. (2009). The guillotine: Japan’s demographic transformation and its security implications. Issues and Insights, 9 (10), 1-62

Boling, P. (1998). Family Policy in Japan. Journal of Social Policy, 27, 173-190.

Bourdieu, P (1984). Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1990b). The logic of practice (R. Nice, Trans.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. (Original work published 1980)

Bräuninger, D., Gräf, B., Gruber, K., Neuhaus, M., & Schneider, S. (2002). The demographic challenge. Germany: Deutsche Bank Research.

Chinn, P. W. (2002). Asian and Pacific Islander women scientists and engineers: A narrative exploration of model minority, gender, and racial stereotypes. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 39(4), 302-323.

Coleman, J. S. (1990). Foundations of social theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Higuchi, K., Marumoto, Y., Yanson, Y., & Dōmoto, T. (1991). Onna wa naze kodomo o umanai no ka: shussei ritsu teika o kangaeru (Why Women Don’t Have Children: Thinking About the Falling Fertility Rate). Tokyo: Junpōsha.

Hrebenar, R., Nakainura, A., & Nakamura, A. (1998). Lobby Regulation in the Japanese Diet. Parliamentary Affairs, 51 (4), 551-558.

Kasai, M. (2009). The role of Japanese culture in psychological health implications for counselling and clinical psychology. In International Handbook of Cross-Cultural Counseling (pp. 159-171). New York: SAGE Publications.

Kumazawa, M. (1996). Portraits of the Japanese workplace. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Leibenstein, H. (1957). Economic backwardness and economic growth: Studies in the theory of economic development. New York: Wiley.

Matsui, K., Suzuki, H., Eoyang, C., Akiba, T., & Tatebe, K. (2010, October 1). Womenomics 3.0: The time is now. Retrieved December 10, 2013, from The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc: http://tinyurl.com/l983ofk

Ministry of Health and Welfare (Kōseishō). (1996). Daijinkanbō seisaku ka (Policy Planning and Evaluation Division, Minister’s Secretariat). Tokyo: Government of Japan.

Ministry of Labour (Rodo ̄sho ̄). (1996). kuji kaigo kyugyo ̄ suishin shitsucho ̄ (Office for the Advancement of Childrearing Support Leaves). Tokyo: Government of Japan.

Nikkei Shimbun (Nihon Keizai Shimbun). (29). Ko sodate shien keikaku mokuhyou tasei o dannen (article on collapse of ‘Angel Plan’). Tokyo: Nikkei.com.

Nishiyama, K., & Johnson, J. V. (1997). Karoshi: Death from overwork: Occupational health consequences of Japanese production management. International Journal of Health Services, 27, 625-641.

Prime Minister’s Office (So ̄rifu). (1995). Japanese Women Today. Tokyo: Government of Japan.

Retherford, R. D., Ogawa, N., & Sakamoto, S. (1996). Values and fertility change in Japan. Population Studies, 50, 5-25.

Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human behaviour. New York: Macmillan.

Parsons, T. (1951). The social system. London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Tucker, John, “Japanese Confucian Philosophy”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/japanese-confucian/>.

Wingfield-Hayes, R. (2013, March 22). BBC News. Retrieved December 10, 2013, from Japan: The worst developed country for working mothers?: http://tinyurl.com/cb89nsc

本稿は (Sugano)、2005年6月4日、第13回バークシャー会議(The Berkshire Conference of Women Historians 1930年にはじまる)で報告したもの に加筆修正したものである。

0