Introduction

There is a strong connection between the social self and socialization, inseparable from identity creation. In this way, people can realize their collective presence and themselves, achieving a harmonious relationship with the world beyond their own. They can also reach beyond their local communities to become part of a global society. It is critical to examine American pragmaticists’ contributions and interrelationships: Berger & Luckman (1966), Charles Horton Cooley (1964), Richard Jenkins (2008), and George Herbert Mead (1934). American pragmatics explain the social self and its relationship to socialization. They understand this concerning Bladerunner (1982), Ghost in a Shell (1995), and Prisoner (1967).

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Socialization

According to Capozza & Brown (2000, p. 20), socialization is an inevitable consequence of human existence in society. According to the founder of socialization, individuals are integrated into their community to produce “social and cultural continuity” (Clausen, 1968, p. 5). Socialization thus plays a significant role in a culture. Cultures may only exist through acceptable socialization methods. Jenkins (2008) says, “individual identity formation is an integral part of our early socialization processes” (p. 41). Jenkins (2008) and Berger & Luckman (1966) have similar views regarding socialization. Berger & Luckman (1966) propose two types of socialization: primary and secondary. A child’s initial stages of accepting cultural norms and practices become the initial stages of favour. For Jenkins (2008) and Berger & Luckman (1966), the initial type of socialization is the most significant, followed by the second type, which manifests in the primary and continues afterwards.

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Jenkins (2008) asserts that “individuals are unique and variable at this level of socialization, but selfhood is a social construct” (p. 40). As a result of these individuals passing past the primary level of socialization, the secondary level is an actual test of identity and social self for these individuals. In addition to Mead (1934) and Cooley (1964), this area has significantly interested American pragmatics. For example, in Bladerunner (1982), Roy Batty and his compatriots were introduced to the world without primary socialization, resulting in catastrophic consequences such as brutal violence and death. As a result, his individuality was compromised and thoroughly tainted. He was treated as an Epsilon in mass production and capital consumption. Androids seek secondary socialization. They aim to understand and redefine their presence in a world of danger and consumption.

Roy tells Deckard before he dies:

“How strange to live in fear, isn’t it? That is what being a slave is all about.”

Deckard then realizes Roy’s primary socialization was slavery. In striving for freedom, he demonstrated his humanity. In Ghost in a Shell (1995), Kusanagi seeks to locate her “ghost” while redefining her original identity to perfect her secondary socialization.

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The social self

Throughout history, subjective and objective reality has been subject to considerable debate, particularly concerning the social self. Berger & Luckman (1966) assert that truth constantly changes and can be personal or objective. Languages and traditions are fundamental components of society, so they must appear impartial. Subjective reality emerges from socialization and identity formation. Alternatively, a social self exists within a personal existence. At the same time, selfhood is part of a larger objective reality but is also intrinsically linked to socialization. Social identity and selfhood would not be possible without socialization (Jenkins, 2008; Berger & Luckman, 1966; George Mead, 1934; Cooley, 1964). According to Berger & Luckman (1966), identity is a construct of organisms, and the construction of these organisms impedes their ability to construct reality socially. Jenkins (2008) says the social self reflects similarities and differences among people (p. 17). Stuart Hall (1996) asserts that identities are formed more efficiently by identifying differences and exclusions from others. For example, a former secret agent is captured and imprisoned in an idyllic village in The Prisoner (1967) and assigned a number—Number Six—by his captors. In such scenarios, identities are differentiated based on the bare minimum of valuation. Differences distinguish social selves. For example, Canadians may not explain their identity but say they are not American.

‍Cooley (1964) and Mead (1934) focus on impression management and personality analysis. Mead developed a seminal theory titled “Symbolic Interactionism.” As Cooley (1964) and Mead (1934) argue, individuals create their identities through communication, and the social self is created through a constantly evolving process. As part of this ongoing process, the social self is influenced by four factors: 1) the “I,” the unpredictable and unorganized individual; 2) “me,” the image of the social self seen through the magnifying glass of other people’s reactions; 3) the generalized other; and 4) significant others (Mead, 1934, p. 7). Mead (1934) stated that social selves result from a self-portrait constructed by the self by taking the role of the other, imagining how the “I” looks to another person. Interactionists, like Cooley (1964) and Mead (1934), call this the self from behind a glass and insist that it is socially constructed. In essence, the “me” is viewed through others’ reactions. A typical example of this is the “I” speaking, the “me” hearing, and the “I” of this moment is present in the “me” of the next moment (Mead, 1934, p. 12). Furthermore, the generalized other is organized information about a group’s general expectations and attitudes. The concept of “me” does not exist at birth. The “me” formed only through continual symbolic interaction—first with family, then with playmates, and with institutions such as school—is the form of the person we are today; for example, in Prisoner (1967), Number Six is surrounded by generalized others who attempt to normalize his existence as a number under the influence of “big brother.” As the foundations of society (Jenkins, 2008; Berger & Luckman, 1966; George Mead, 1934; Cooley, 1964), such pressures occur daily.

A collective world does not recognize identities until it differentiates them so that the collective shrinks and uniqueness is recognized (Hall, 1996). As a result, the “I” can be identified as entirely separate from the “me.” However, the “me” also urges the “I” to become more stable.

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Conclusion

Socialization and the social self have a direct relationship, and one supports the other. The social self maintains cohesion based on societal influences, generalizing others, and primary socialization. American pragmatists contend that socialization creates the social self. As a result of this constant revision of one’s social self, one achieves recognition through differentiation.

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Bibliography

Berger, P. L., & Luckman, T. (1966). The Social Construction of Reality: a Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Anchor Books.Capozza, D., & Brown, R. (2000). Social Identity Processes. London: Sage.

Clausen, J. A. (1968). Socialization and Society. Boston: Little Brown and Company.

Cooley, C. H. (1964). Human Nature and the Social Order. New York: Schocken.

Hall, S. (1996). Introduction: Who Needs Identity? Questions of Cultural Identity, 4-15.

Jenkins, R. (2008). Social Identity (3rd Edition ed.). New York: Routledge.

Markstein, G. (Director). (1967-1968). The Prisoner [Motion Picture].Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist. (C. W. Morris, Ed.) Chicago: University of Chicago.

Oshii, M. (Director). (1995). Ghost in a Shell [Motion Picture].

Scott, R. (Director). (1982). Bladerunner [Motion Picture].